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ST. LOUIS DIAGNOSTIC AND
DETOXIFICATION CENTER: AN EXPERIMENT
IN NON-CRIMINAL PROCESSING OF PUBLIC
INTOXICANTS
RAYMOND T. NIMMER*
I. BACKGROUND
The task of handling the public drunk is faced by every police
department in this country. As indicated by a national total of over
2,000,000 arrests for public drunkenness (almost 40% of the total
nontraffic arrests), this task consumes a large portion of total police
time and produces a significant burden upon the functioning of other
criminal justice agencies.' That dealing with the public intoxicant
remains largely the exclusive concern of the criminal justice system is
* Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation. The author acknowledges the assistance of
Mary Hartman, a second year law student, University of Chicago, in gathering data and
commenting on this draft, and of various A BF staff members whose critical commentary assisted
in the preparation of this article.
I Six recent editions of the F.B.I. Crime Reports list the following figures:
1961 1,504.671 arrests
1962 1.593,076 arrests
1963 1,514,680 arrests
1964 1,458,821 arrests
1965 1,535,040 arrests
1966 1,485,562 arrests
Adjusted to reflect data from non-reporting jurisdictions, the 2,000,000 figure is a reasonable
estimate See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OF LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JL:TlIc- TASK FORCE REPORT- DRUNKENNESS (1967) [hereinafter cited as DRUNKENNESS
Ri-PORTI
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more a result of tradition, resort to expedient methods and indifference
on the part of other agencies, than of any notion that the intoxicated
man is a criminal deserving punishment. 2 Despite this, many
drunkenness arrests result in conviction and criminal penalty.
The drunkenness laws* are seldom enforced uniformly. The police
prefer to handle middle and upper class intoxicants through informal
means such as transporting them to their home. On the other hand,
arrest and criminal prosecution are commonplace in lower class, and
especially, Skid Row sections of a city.3 In non-Skid Row areas,
handling the publicly intoxicated resident is regarded as a sidelight, an
insignificant and bothersome protective task. In Skid Row areas,
enforcement of the drunkenness laws is frequently the primary job of
a specialized squad of officers, and represents the most visible and
extensive system of providing social services and controlling the men.
One study of police operations on Skid Row characterized these laws
as virtually the only law that the Skid Row man knows.'
This differential enforcement has been explained as resulting from
the fact that there is no way other than an arrest to protect the Skid
Row drunk.5 Although the explanation is certainly more complex, this
statement does emphasize one important factor about the enforcement
of the drunkenness laws. The purpose behind the enforcement of these
laws is not found in the common criminal law rhetoric of deterrence,
punishment, of even rehabilitation.
Thus, what is commonly referred to as the "public drunkenness
problem" is best understood in its Skid Row context.' Although the
2. The typical drunkenness statute contains two elements: the fact of the actor's intoxication
and the intoxicant's presence in a public place. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-943 (1947); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 12-611 (Burns 1956). The numerous variations on this theme include requirements
of "loud and boisterious" or "disorderly" conduct accompanying the intoxication. CODE OF
ALA. tit. 14, § 120 (1959); GA. CODE ANN. § 58-608 (1965). Occasionally, public intoxication
is defined as disorderly conduct. CHICAGO CITY COUNCIL J. 2562 (1969).
3. This differential en-forcement may have been the original intention in enacting the
drunkenness statutes. In any event, the "public place" requirement produces a de facto focus on
lower class drinkers who are less able and less inclined by cultural norms to confine their drinking
to private places. ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ADDICTION RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF TORONTO,
REVOLVING DOOR: A FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1 (1966). With respect to enforcement
patterns, see W. LAFAVE, ARREST 109 & n.29 (1965); LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS
(D. McIntyre ed. 1967).
4. Note, The Law on Skid Row, 38 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 22 (1961). Concerning the relationship
between the drunkenness laws and other vagrancy-type crimes, see Foote, Vagrancy-type Law and
Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956).
5. W. LA FAvE, ARREST 109 (1965).
6. There have been a number of published articles discussing the enforcement of these laws.
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policies followed and the level of enforcement vary, several concerns
reoccur among the jurisdictions. Arrests of non-disorderly, but usually
intoxicated, derelict men allegedly provide the men with a brief respite
from the extended drinking which can be one facet of a Skid Row way
of life. In some cities, enforcement practices establish the jail as a
substitute for non-existent municipal shelter facilities providing the men
with free housing for one night.7 Additionally, they deal with medical
problems of the men and serve the law enforcement concern of
protecting them from the possibility of violent assault and robbery.
Often the arrests are employed primarily to service a perceived
community concern to remove the unsightly derelict men from the sight
of the "normal" populace, and these pressures can lead to an
extremely high arrest rate.8
Intra-system pressures are important in shaping enforcement policy.
Each criminal justice agency must allocate scarce resources according
to its own priorities. There is substantial feedback among the
agencies-the arrest process is influenced by court procedures and the
facilities available at the jail. 9 Also an element of irrationality is
injected in that policies and procedures often reflect traditional
approaches in the jurisdiction, rather than continuing re-assessment of
fact.
Despite some arguably laudible motives, the criminal process
provides no more than minimal, temporary assistance. Arrests are
processed on a mass basis, frequently as a result of the operations of
a specially designated "bum squad". The arrestees are herded into cells
with inadequate size and almost no facilities to treat the medical and
other problems that arise. Long before the men are led into the
courtroom, the cells become filthy and permeated with the stench of
See, e.g., SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS IN SOUTH
CAROLINA (1968); Hutt, The Changing Legal Approach to Public Intoxication, 31 FED. PROB.
40 (1%7), Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling the Chronic Court Offender: The Challenge of the
Courts, 19 S.C L. REV. 305 (1967); Miller, Arrests for Public Intoxication in Cleveland, 3 Q.J.
Of STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 38 (1942); Nimmer, Public Drunkenness: Criminal Law Reform, 4 VAL.
U L REv. 1 (1969); Stem, Public Drunkenness: Crime or Health Problem?, 374 ANNALS 147
(1967)
7 See Note, The Law on Skid Row, 38 CHI-KENT L. REv. 22 (1961); R. Nimmer Enforcement
of Vagrancy-type Laws in Chicago (unpublished manuscript 1969).
8. This situation obtained in Washington, D.C., prior to a disruptive Appellate Court ruling.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TASK FORCE REPORT:
DRUNKENNESS (1967).
9. See Murtagh, Status Offenses and the Law, 36 FORD. L. REv. 51 (1967); Murtagh, Arrests
Jbr Public Intoxication, 35 FORD. L. REv. 1 (1966).
Vol. 1970: 4751
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dried blood, sweat and vomit. The court procedure is also based on a
mass production model. Aided by a large number of guilty pleas, it is
not uncommon for over 100 men to be processed in less than one hour.
Little attention is paid to the niceties of due process requirements."
At its best, the procedure is a stop gap measure, filling the void left
by a failure of other social help agencies to meet the needs of the men.
Recidivism rates demonstrate that no more than short-term help is
provided. Nevertheless, the cost of processing these arrests is immense.
In Chicago the annual cost of processing over 50,000 derelict-drunk
arrests is estimated at over $750,000." Further, the social cost of the
burden placed upon the police and the lower criminal courts, and the
impact upon respect for criminal justice resulting from the perverted,
mass production accommodation to the arrest and re-arrest process is
inestimable.
In recent years, the propriety of delegating this task to the criminal
justice system has been much discussed.' 2 The commentators invariably
suggest that the criminal label be discarded. Although there is some
disagreement, 13 most commentators go from this position to suggest
that alternative programs be developed to replace the criminal process.
The clear trend, embodied in the recommendations of a Presidential
Commission and an AMA-ABA Committee, is toward the notion that
the criminal process should be replaced by "civil detoxification
systems." This article discusses the results of an American Bar
10. Although there are few acquittals, there are indications that many of the arrested men are
not intoxicated at the time of their arrest.
On the basis of the Breathalyzer Test, only 73% were actually legally intoxicated ...
Others were apparently picked up because of their gait which was unsteady due to other
reasons, such as severe malnutrition. . . . Still others may have been captured
accidentally.
PHILADELPHIA DIAGNOSTIC & RELOCATION SERVICE CORPORATION. ALTERNATIVES TO ARREST 15
(1967). See also REPORT OF THE ALCOHOL PROJECT OF THE EMORY UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY 10 (1963).
II. The annual cost of processing over 40,000 arrests in Washington. D.C., was estimated at
over $3 million. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. TASK FORCE
REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 485 n. 57 (1966).
12. In addition to the previously cited articles, see F. ALLEN. THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 7-9 (1964); E. LISANSKY. THE CHRONIC DRUNKENNESS OFFENDER IN CONNECTICUT
(1967); MINNESOTA COMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT. MISDEMEANANT OFFENDERS (1968);
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND VELFARE. THE COURT AND TIlE
CHRONIC INEBRIATE (1965); Hutt, Recent Forensic Developments in the Field of Alcoholism, 8
WM. & MARY L. REV. 343 (1967); H. Mattick & R. Chused, The Misdemeanant Orfender
(unpublished, University of Chicago Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, 1967).
13. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 345 (1968).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss1/4
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Foundation study of the oldest and the most widely publicized
detoxification program, the St. Louis Detoxification and Diagnostic
Center for Intoxicated Men. 4
The results of this study are significant on two levels. First, and most
obvious, the study provides a means to evaluate the impact of the St.
Louis program. Second, the problems and achievements of the St.
Louis program provide a base from which to speculate concerning the
concept of replacing criminal laws with civil detoxification systems.
II. DETOXIFICATION CONCEPTUALIZED
The detoxification concept involves the creation of a medically-
oriented facility to which public intoxicants are taken.' The facility
resembles a hospital in terms of the medical services available, except
that serious ailments are referred to other hospital facilities. The
detoxification center focuses upon the diagnostic process and care for
minor ailments. Although the detoxification center may accept walk-
in patients, the system is designed primarily to service men who are
brought in either by the police or by a special civilian squad. The
patient is held at the center for only a few days and, in addition to
medical care, may receive vocational or therapeutic counseling and
referral to long-term treatment or residential facilities.
It is possible to identify five objectives of the new system. First, by
removing the criminal label and inserting a civil procedure, the new
system seeks to avoid the stigmatizing effect that the criminal law
allegedly has and which supposedly serves as a block to rehabilitation.
Although this aspect is frequently emphasized, there is evidence that the
criminal system has little stigmatizing impact upon Skid Row
offenders." Extensive research concerning the attitudes of the men
involved is needed to assess the extent to which the relabeling represents
a social gain, but such an effort was beyond the scope and the resources
of our research.
14 Although this study wras supported by the A.B.F. with funds from the Ford Foundation,
the conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not represent the official position of
the Bar I-oundation or of 1-ord, Much of the following discussion is based upon observation of
police practices during the summer of 1969 and confidential interviews with various participants
in the system
15 DisTRICT oF CO L\IBIk DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH. DETOXIFICATION CENTER
OPK-RkTING PROCEDURES (1968); DRLNKEFNESS REPORT 4-5,50-58.
16 See Amir, Sociological Studi o] the House oJ Correction, 28 A.Nt. J. CORR. 20 (March-
,\pril 1966), Rubington, Failure as a HeavT Drinker: The Case oJ the Chronic Drunkenness
Of fnder, SOCIET", CULTU RE AND DRINKING PROBLEMS 146 (D. Pittman & C. Synder eds. 1962).
Vol. 1970: 4751
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Second, the new facility provides "more appropriate, humane and
sanitary" shelter for the men than is typically found in the "drunk
tank" of the jail. Under the criminal process the conditions of the
drunk tank frequently are deplorable, but in comparison to many of
the other shelter services available to the man or to the prospect of
spending a hazardous night on the street, the jail often appears to the
arresting officer as the preferable alternative.17 By providing a more
aesthetically pleasing environment the choice of the officer is more
clear cut.
Third, the new facility makes expert medical help available to the
men. Physical deterioration, latent medical illness and emergency
medical needs are characteristic of the Skid Row men who become
involved in the arrest process. Often the obvious medical debilitation
of the man is the primary motive for arrest. Nevertheless, no medical
care is available at the local jail and many deaths occur and serious
illnesses go undetected."'
Fourth, the system reduces the burden on the criminal agencies
resulting from processing the large number of drunk arrests. The need
to divert resourses to processing these essentially non-criminals
allegedly hinders effective handling of more violent crimes and
criminals. Also, the new system is expected to reduce the overall drain
upon the public treasury.
Fifth, the system introduces the potentiality of rehabilitative therapy
or referral. 9 Rehabilitation here is loosely defined to include
vocational, residential, drinking and psychiatric improvement. This is
the only one of the objectives which is not one of the justifications
advanced for the arrest of the men under a criminal charge. It is a clear
departure from the essentially short-term concerns of the criminal
agencies, and it represents, to a limited extent, the notion that the
ultimate goal of any system relating to the derelict men is to achieve
their rehabilitation. There'are variations among the programs
concerning the extent of emphasis upon rehabilitation therapy which
show up in the number of days that the man is held at the Center, and
the extent to which referral or in-house care is the primary
17. Observations of a research team from Toronto suggest that the repeated incarceration
serves to enhance, noticeably, the physical condition of the men. J. OLIN, THE CHRONIC
DRUNKENNESS OFFENDER: PHYSICAL HEALTH 62 (1968).
18. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TASK FORCE REPORT:
DRUtNKENNESS 475-78 (1967) 16 deaths in 1964-65 in Washington, D.C.).
19. H. Mattick & R. Chused, The Misdemeanant Offender 37 (unpublished, University of
Chicago Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, 1967).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss1/4
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rehabilitative tool. None of the operating detoxification programs
challenges the assumption that rehabilitation is a proper goal.20
There is a significant divergence of opinion concerning the preferable
method of bringing the men into the program. All of the programs
recognize the necessity of seeking the men out on the street. Although
a few detoxification programs utilize "civilian rescue teams" to pick
up the men, most of the programs retain the police as the primary
intake agency.2' When the patient's contact with the program is
initiated by civilian rescue teams the entire process is voluntary. When
patrolmen are used the voluntary nature of the system is uncertain and
a critical question of state power is presented which has seldom been
subjected to debate.22
III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ST. Louis PROGRAM
A. Physical Characteristics.
With these comments as background, we turn our attention
specifically to the St. Louis detoxification program. The St. Louis
20 But see Morris & Hawkins, The Over-reach of the Criminal Law, 9 MIDWAY 1, 9 (1969).
21. See DRUNKENNESS REPORT 58-65 (description of the Vera Justice Foundation's Bowery
Project).
22. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to explore fully the doctrinal problems
involved in the police-initiated systems, a few comments are appropriate. Where the system is
structured to compel the man to enter and remain at a treatment facility it appears as a variant
of civil commitment for mental illness, but it is based solely upon a police pick-up without
intervening court adjudication. The questions of establishing sufficient criteria and of the ability
of a patrolman to apply those criteria are crucial.
There are, apparently, two current theories of action. The first is to justify the pick-up under
a public health law, severely limiting the number of days that the man is held at a detoxification
center See D.C. Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act of 1967, D.C. CODE ANN. § 90-452 (Supp. 1968).
The second is followed in St. Louis, and involves defining the pickup and detention as
.'voluntary," giving the intoxicated man an "on-the-street" choice between criminal charges and
transportation to the detoxification center. During the stay at the center, the criminal charges are
held in suspension with the threat, seldom enforced, that they will be re-instituted if the man leaves
the program prior to completing the prescribed term. If a seven-day confinement would be invalid
without the voluntary label, this arguably represents an illustration of the state using threats to
accomplish indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also, it is questionable that the intoxicant can
make a reasoned decision while drunk, and it is likely that the wishes of the authority figure
(patrolman) would be a strong influence.
A final observation is that the justification for any pick-up operation varies according to the
goals of the system. Where the goals are short-range, the pick-up function performs an emergency
care role. There are arguments that this can be justified under common law grounds. However,
where rehabilitation is the primary purpose of the program, the pick-up process serves to
encourage "unmotivated" derelict men to enter a treatment program. The encouragement can
often become indirect coercion which must be justified on grounds similar to those established
for civil commitment for mental illness. In most programs, both goals are present and the
justification for pick-up is a combination.
Vol. 1970: 4751
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prdgram was the first operative detoxification system in the United
States. It was initiated in late 1966 with the help of a demonstration
grant from the U.S. Office of Law Enforcement Assistance. The idea
for the center came through the combined efforts of several local
experts in the field of alcoholism treatment and members of the St.
Louis Metropolitan Police Department. The program budget is in
excess of $200,000 per year, and it is designed to handle a maximum
of 1,600 cases per year.?3
The St. Louis version of the detoxification system involves a seven
day stay at the treatment center. Intoxicants are picked up from the
street during the normal patrols of the St. Louis police. Only men
brought in by the police are accepted for the program. The procedure
requires the officer to inquire whether the arrested person wishes to be
taken to the detoxification center. 24 This choice has been labeled
"voluntary or else."
During the first year of operation of the detoxification system, the
center was located in the St. Mary's Infirmary. This facility was
centrally situated with respect to the areas of the highest incidence of
drunkenness arrests, and it proved to be a convenient location for the
police officers. However, after the Justice Department grant expired,
the facility was faced with a monetary crisis.25 Eventually, funding was
obtained from a state agency, on the condition that the center would
be moved out of the infirmary and into a state operated facility. This
new location was far removed from the locale of the most drunkenness
23. ALCOHOL, ALCOHOLISM AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 35-45 (D. Gillespie ed. 1969); St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department, Application for Grant 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Application].
24. A police officer, upon observing an intoxicated individual who by reason of his
condition may prove to be a danger either to himself or others, will detain the individual
and convey him to the Detoxification Center. . . when:
I. There are no other criminal charges against the individual;
2. No signs of injury . . . ;
3. No complainant wishes to pursue the incident as a prosecuting witness, or
4. The intoxicant does not indicate a wish for a trial or legal representation.
Upon arrival at the Center the officer will prepare a City Court summons on the charge
of "Public Drunkenness." At this point the officer will release the individual to the custody
of a member of the Center's staff. After the subject is admitted his stay is purely voluntary.
If the intoxicant leaves the Center prior to medical release by the physician, the summons
will be processed.
Letter from G. Gaertner, Associate City Counselor to Chief of Police Broston, July II, 1966.
25. These problems and the eventual solution are discussed in newspaper articles reprinted as
supplements to the Quarterly Reports of the Project.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss1/4
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arrests, and this move had some severe effects upon the functioning of
the system which are discussed later.
Although billed as a "sobering-up station," the St. Louis center is
tied quite closely to an effort to rehabilitate the Skid Row men. z" A
basic premise for establishing the new system was that "the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department believes that the chronic police case
inebriate is salvageable. . . . it proposes to establish a sobering-up
station for rehabilitation of some of the offenders."
[Tihe St. Louis police department plans to utilize the detoxification
center in order that chronic inebriates may be detoxified, built up
physically, and exposed to an alcoholism treatment mileau at the center.
Furthermore, they will receive counseling concerning their employment
potential with a referral to the appropriate community agency as well
as a followup. Those individuals who may need retraining will be
counseled and referred appropriately for the necessary rehabilitation. It
is believed that this exposure through the multidisciplinary team and the
mileau at the center will have an effect upon each patient. . . . This
technique should have an impact upon his chronicity, and serve as an
impediment to the "revolving door" process of arrest, jail, release,
intoxication, re-arrest, and jail again."
Thus, the system attempts to meet rehabilitative objectives both by
providing therapy during the patient's stay at the center and by
providing appropriate referrals to aftercare agencies.
B. Target Population.
It is not possible to attempt to evaluate, or even to discuss, the
performance of the St. Louis program in the absence of a more precise
definition of what the program seeks to accomplish. There are three
possibilities. First, to provide medical, shelter and rehabilitation
services to all Skid Row types who are in need of these services.
Second, to provide these services to all public intoxicants in St. Louis
who need them. Third, to improve the services that are provided to
public intoxicants who would otherwise be processed through the
criminal system.
There is no evidence in either the literature or the statements of the
project personnel to indicate that the center was designed to deal with
26 Compare St. Louis Globe-Democrat, May 24, 1966, at 1, col. 4, with V. STRECHER, LAW
ENFORCEMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT SOURCE BOOK A-27 (1968) ("places them in a medical,
social and psychological treatment environment.").
27 Application at 10.
Vol. 1970: 475]
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the first of these.2s To do so would have converted the detoxification
center into a multi-purpose Skid Row service agency. While there are
strong arguments which indicate that this is the only rational course
to follow, the purpose of this article is to discuss the St. Louis
performance in terms of its own goals.
The evidence is that the St. Louis program adopts the third
formulation stated above. Under a sub-heading entitled "Target
Groups or Organizations Affected," the application for a
demonstration grant states the "primary goal" of the program as
involving "the treatment of individuals arrested by the police for being
'drunk-on-street.'" Similarly, under the heading of "need to be met"
the application states:
It has been clearly shown that repeated jailing does not act as a deterrent
to the public police case inebriate. . . . It is evident that there is a need
to provide medical treatment and rehabilitative services for the chronic
public intoxicant and thereby remove him from the "revolving door" of
arrest, detention, and incarceration. If this need is met, it will relieve the
burden upon the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department and all other
local police agencies confronted with similar problems. 29
It is clear that this language does not result from the assumption that
the pre-existing arrest process identified all or even a large portion of
the public intoxicants in the city. The application for a grant
specifically recognizes the fact that the rate in St. Louis has
traditionally been one of the lowest per capita rates in the country. For
example, the St. Louis arrest rate for 1964 and 1965 did not exceed
4,000, while the annual arrest rate in Washington, D.C., a city of
similar size, exceeded 40,000.30
That this difference did not result solely from a lower number of
incidents of public drunkenness in St. Louis is shown by the fact that
in St. Louis in 1963 the arrest rate rose to 7,847. This sharp increase
was due to two procedural changes within the police department. First,
an efficient method of processing the drunkenness arrestees was
instituted whereby the arresting officer could call for a specialized van
to take the men through the processing stage. Second, departmental
28. This is not to say that there was no recognition by the planners that most of the arrestees
are Skid-Row types. Jacobs, Medical Approach to Handling Drunks, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
June 26, 1966, at 1, col. 3 ("They are the men who populate Skid Row."). See generally D.
PrUTMAN & W. GORDON, REVOLVING DOOR (1958).
29. Application at 7.
30. See also DRUNKENNESS REPORT 2.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss1/4
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orders were issued during 1963 directing patrolmen to increase their
diligence in arresting drunken men. It should be noted that although
these changes were in effect for only a few months, the impact was
enough to more than double the annual arrest rate.3
The two changes noted above were coupled with the introduction of
an innovative procedure to deal with the medical ailments of publicly
intoxicated men. Labeled Code 26, this process requires that
drunkenness arrestees be taken to a hospital for examination prior to
taking them to a police lock-up. By adopting this procedure and
simultaneously directing an increased level of enforcement, the
department demonstrated its perception that not only are the medical
needs of the public intoxicants significant, but that the low arrest rate
fails to reach all of those who need medical help.
Nevertheless, the police were retained, along with their preexisting
law enforcement policies, as an intake mechanism, and the new facility
was designed in terms of number of beds and length of stay to
accommodate no more than the caseload under the criminal system.
The new program relied on the police practices to determine both the
extent of the "problem" and the people who would be reached by the
treatment process. The assumption had to be that the arrestee
population was selected on the basis of some criteria bearing a rational
relationship to the immediate care and long term rehabilitation
objectives of the new system.
The comments of program personnel are obscure as to exactly in
what situations the public drunkenness law was being invoked. As the
1963 incidents verify, under the law enforcement policy of St. Louis,
neither public intoxication, nor public intoxication accompanied by
apparent medical needs describe the arrest criteria. Perhaps the most
perceptive comments on this issue were made by David Pittman, a
leading figure in the movement to establish the St. Louis detoxification
program. He notes that the police, due to processing requirements
discussed later in this article, preferred not to arrest any public
intoxicants, but preferred to send them home or to their family or
friends for care.32 The implication is that arrests selected out destitute
(Skid Row) intoxicants who had neither family or friends nor resources
to obtain shelter.
31. The arrest rates for the following years were: 3761 (1964), 2445 (1965). Arrest data
furnished by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department.
32. S AUERBACH, HOSPITAL REPLACES THE DRUNK TANK IN ST. Louis ALCOHOLISM
PROGRAM 3 (1966).
Vol. 1970: 475]
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Although accurate, this analysis fails to go far enough. Not all
destitute intoxicants were arrested and processed through the formal
system. Pittman fails to take full account of the effect of
intradepartmental pressures to avoid drunkenness arrests. As we
suggest in the next section, these pressures result in arrests initiated
only when immediate pressures do not allow the patrolman to ignore
the intoxicant, and there is no convenient way of removing the man
without arrest. The result is that many intoxicants needing the help of
the center are left on the street, and those who are picked up may suffer
less from the afflictions of intoxication than from the malady of being
in the wrong place at the wrong time.
It might be argued that the program is less concerned with arrest
patterns prior to instituting the new system, than with the police
activities after the program began operation. Such an argument is
based upon the probability that police arrest practices are affected by
changes in the type of disposition the arrestee receives. The suggestion
is that the police will come to see the new program as desirable for the
intoxicants and will structure their arrest criteria so as to make full use
of the services available. A comment by a command level officer is
relevant there,
The detoxification center will change the attitude of the police. They
know now there is some place to take the drunks for help and to get
them out of their hair.
In order to encourage this effect, Dr. Kendis, the co-director of the
center, gives a series of lectures on alcoholism and public intoxication
to each new class at the policy academy. However, as indicated in the
following pages, our research indicates that, rather than recognizing the
program as a positive step, St. Louis patrolmen generally are
dissatisfied with the new center.34
33. Id.
34. The response of the program to allegations that the police operations are selecting out
public intoxicants on a different basis than before is founded in demographic statistics of the
patients which indicate that they are similar to public drunkenness arrestees in other cities. This,
of course, merely verifies that police pick-ups continue to be made from out of the same general
category, and says nothing concerning the condition of the men when arrested which is the
significant variable for the purposes of the immediate care concerns. See ST. Louis
DETOXIFICATION CENTER, FIFTH QUARTERLY REPORT 16 (1968); V. STRECHER, LAW
ENFORCEMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT SOURCE BOOK A-28 (1967); J. WEBER, FINAL EVALUATION
REPORT, ST. Louis DETOXIFICATION AND DIAGNOSTIC CENTER (1969) [hereinafter cited as
WEBER].
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW PROGRAM ON ST. Louis POLICE
PRACTICES
A. Policies Prior to the Detoxification Program.
Appraisal of the impact of the detoxification program requires an
understanding of police practices before it was started. The
traditionally low St. Louis arrest rate does not result from police
perception of the problems of the public drunks as small or
infrequently encountered. Instead, it is a function of the influence of
tradition and internal department pressures and priorities.
The influence of tradition is found primarily in the atypical reaction
of the department to public pressures for clean streets. One factor
which seems unique to the St. Louis department is that the formulation
of official departmental policy has been substantially unrelated to any
public desire to "clean up" the streets by removing the eyesore, derelict
drunks. In all other cities visited during our research this was an
important determinant of police policy. Part of the explanation for its
relative nonimportance in St. Louis is that the derelict men are
scattered throughout the city and tend to settle in poor, out-of-the-way
areas where the desire for clean streets is not important.
We do not suggest that our research found businessmen, political
leaders and others commonly interested in clean streets to be
uninterested in having the drunks removed in St. Louis. Most certainly
they are not uninterested. Several businessmen interviewed during the
summer expressed extreme displeasure about the lack of police interest
in removing the drunks. An influential businessman's group is
presently considering hiring a special, private force to deal with the
public drunk. The political spectrum, apparently also is sensitive about
the public presence of these men. During the summer, there were
persistent rumors that pressure was being exerted on the police to
implement a campaign to remove derelict-drunks from the area
surrounding the government buildings. This pressure resulted in 13
arrests for loitering in one day, but was eventually ignored by the
police.
The key point here seems to be that complaints to the department
are seldom made because, when such demands are entered, the police
response, if any, is limited. In other cities studied, the police devote
substantial effort to respond to such pressures. Reasons for the
apparent independence in St. Louis are that other activities have
created substantial good will with the influential citizenry and that the
Vol. 1970: 4751
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police are regulated financially by the state, not the city government.
Equally important now is a strong tradition of independence which has
developed, at least in this area.
The absence of effective external pressure to concentrate on problems
of the public drunk permits the department to establish a very low
priority for drunkenness arrests, reflecting the belief that the task of a
police department should be to focus upon serious or violent crimes.35
This is implemented through an informally communicated, but
nonetheless official, policy of limiting the number of "non-quality
arrests" (i.e. drunkenness, vagrancy, loitering) that are made by the
officers of the department. There are indications that such arrests
produce negative intra-departmental evaluations of the officers' work
if they become too frequent. Also, several officers suggest that fellow
patrolmen look down upon those who make frequent non-quality
arrests.
An additional factor which limits these arrests concerns the Code 26
procedure, mentioned above. As initially enacted, this procedure
provided a very efficient way of handling the drunk arrest. Although
the specialized police vans were later withdrawn, the requirement of
taking the arrestee to a hospital was retained. The result was that the
processing of a drunkenness arrest took a large amount of time. Police
estimates indicate that over 3 hours were required for processing the
average arrest. 31 When combined with the departmental
characterization of the drunkenness arrest as non-desirable and
unimportant, this was a strong deterrent for the use of a formal arrest
as a method of dealing with the public drunk.
This does not mean that the St. Louis police invariably ignored the
public intoxicant. It indicates only that the formal drunkenness arrest
was avoided. Informal methods of handling the drunk were available
and frequently used. These procedures included taking the drunken
35. WEBER 16. Comparing the "tolerant" attitude of St. Louis to other cities, Weber makes
the following observation:
For the year 1965, St. Louis reports a total number of arrests of 44,701 while Washington,
D.C. and Atlanta, Georgia, report 86,464 and 92,965 arrests respectively. Now, by
deducting all drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy arrests ...one finds St.
Louis has a total of 36,262 "quality arrests" as compared to 20,334 in Washington and
21,751 in Atlanta . . . .What is demonstrated here is not a leniency or tolerance for law
violations but rather a different set of professional standards as to what constitutes good
enforcement.
WEBER 16.
36. Under the efficient processing model, arresting officer time involved an average of 30
minutes. Letter from Lt. James Chapman to G.W. Fahlgren, A.B.F. staff, August 19, 1966.
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man to his home, putting him in a cab, driving him off of the
patrolman's beat, pushing him into an inconspicuous corner, and
dumping him at the riverfront. However, since the police keep no
statistics on these activities, there is no way to estimate their frequency.
An additional method of handling the public drunk is through a
protective custody arrest. The department maintains no statistics
concerning these arrests, but several sources indicate that the protective
custody arrest was once used at a three-to-one ration with the drunk
arrest .3 However, it is used much less today, primarily because this,
also, requires taking the arrestee to a hospital, under the Code 26
procedure.
As a result of these various factors, the patrolmen were ambiguous
about their role with respect to the public intoxicant. Paternalistic or
protective attitudes were not general throughout the department. At
best, these attitudes were found in only a minority of the officers. The
typical posture with respect to the drunk arrest was to view it as an
unnecessary diversion, to be used only where other means could not be
employed to dispose of the man and the circumstances indicate that he
could not be ignored. Even in those cases in which paternalistic or
protective concerns motivated the arrest, the officers apparently tended
to think in terms of short-term goals and were rather skeptical
concerning rehabilitation of the men.
B. Police Operations Under the New System.
With the insertion of the detoxification center the orientation of one
agency in the system became rehabilitation and treatment, but the
ambiguity on the part of the individual patrolmen remained. In spite
of official press releases which indicated that departmental policy was
to further the treatment objectives of the detoxification center, internal
departmental pressures remained on the patrolmen. There are
indications that individual patrolmen interpreted this publicity as not
reflecting the actual position of the department.
Dr. Kendis' lectures seem to have not reached the younger
patrolmen, and the effort that has been made to re-instruct veteran
patrolmen concerning their role under the new treatment system has
not been successful. In view of the scattered nature of the intoxicant
population and the consequent involvement of many patrolmen, it is
37 St. Louis Police Department Intra-departmental Report, Analysis of the Pilot Program
"Drunk on the Street," March 28, 1963.
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doubtful that efforts to establish a uniform policy could be effective.
In general, officers interviewed reflected a lack of enthusiasm for the
program and were influenced by the pressures existing before
detoxification, coupled with a new skepticism concerning the success of
treatment.
The problems which might be expected from the differing orientation
of the center and the police did not appear during the early history of
the detoxification center. A number of factors contributed to keeping
the attitudes of the patrolmen below the surface. Perhaps the most
important was that the original location of the center, at St. Mary's
infirmary, was convenient for officers in the highest arrest district.
Regardless of any desire to help the intoxicated men, patrolmen were
inclined to take intoxicants to the center when circumstances required
their removal, rather than to handle them informally or to invoke
formal arrest procedures in a loitering or a vagrancy arrest. The
location of the center reduced dramatically the processing time required
for an arrest for drunkenness. Also, the .atmosphere at St. Mary's was
confortable for the patrolmen. Personnel at the facility made
significant efforts to integrate the officers into their paternalistic
attitude.
When the center was moved to the outskirts of the city, however, the
conflict which had always existed came to light in two specific ways.
The first of these was revealed in a series of articles appearing in one
of the daily newspapers concerning brutal handling of the Skid Row
men.u The St. Louis Post-Dispatch printed several articles describing
testimony indicating that derelict men were frequently dumped on the
riverfront and often beaten by officers.
Brutal handling of destitute intoxicants occurs in every jurisdiction
visited by the ABF during the course of this study. However, control
of officers responsible for such acts in St. Louis is more difficult
because the Skid Row population is scattered throughout the city,
meaning that many officers become involved with the men, and because
informal handling of the intoxicants is frequent.
Officers whom we interviewed reported that they did occasionally
take men to the riverfront. (We did not run across any specific evidence
relating to possible brutality.)39 This practice apparently had a long
38. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1969, § A, at 1, Col. 3; Leeming, City Police Dumping
Alcoholics Near Floodwall Despite Protests, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 5, 1969, § A, at 1,
col. 1.
39. The St. Louis police department conducted an investigation of the brutality charges which
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history in the St. Louis department before the detoxification system
was enacted. As suggested above, this was only one end result of a
general attitude favoring the informal handling of Skid Row arrestees.
The riverfront is an ideal location at which to dump the men because
it puts them out of sight of the "normal" citizenry.
The new location requires a 30 minute ride each way from the area
of most drunkenness arrests. Probably the fact that the officially
acceptable disposition of the men is now inconvenient played a role in
increasing the incidence of this practice after the center moved. Also,
in addition to patrolmen whose attitude towards the derelicts could be
described as punitive, officers whose attitudes were more neutral might
become engaged in this practice. Many officers express frustration with
the new system, a frustration which has three causes. First, is the fact
that officers willing to take the necessary time were frequently told that
there was no room left at the center for the intoxicant they had picked
up. Second, is the observation that many of the men taken repeatedly
to the center would reappear drunken on the streets. The officers feel
that these men were abusing a beneficent program and that the
program has failed to live up to its promises of rehabilitation. Third,
the continued quality arrest emphasis contributes to an uncertainty
concerning high level support for the program.40
A second manifestation of the conflict between police and the center
was the falling off of the admissions rate. The early period of operation
of the center showed gradual increase in police contacts, but this soon
leveled off at a rate only slightly higher than under the criminal
process. During the summer however, admissions dropped to an
average of between 70 and 80 per month, a 20% reduction from earlier
operating levels. During one two-day period in the summer no men
were brought to the center.
The extent to which the police avoided use of the center during this
produced inconclusive results. Officially, the study found that it could neither confirm nor refute
the allegations. Several weeks later the local branch of A.C.L.U. then criticized what it described
as one more example of a departmental "'whitewash" investigation. See Leeming, ACLU
Rebukes Police on Inquiry on Drunks, St. Louis-Dispatch, Jan. 16, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 1.
40. E.L. Dowd, former president of the Police Board of Commissioners, charged that
command officers have failed to support the center in recent months.
Dowd said it was unfortunate that a young officer should be disciplined for dumping
drunks on the riverfront when the officer was simply conforming to the attitudes and
policies established by his superiors.
Leeming, Dowd Censures Dump-Drunk Activity, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1970, § A,
at 14, col. 2.
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time was indicated during the one-day cleanup effort in response to the
political pressures which we mentioned earlier. The police produced 13
arrests on this one day, but these were made under the loitering statute.
Even when there was pressure to arrest the derelicts the detoxification
alternative was voided.
The need to obtain greater police use of the center was foremost on
the minds of the consultants for the program and many of the staff
members. The project codirector, Dr. Kendis, was forced on several
occasions to direct requests to various police districts that more men
be brought to the center.4' One such communique asked that three or
four men be brought to the center during the evening. Apparently,
similar pressures succeeded in temporarily increasing the admissions
rate during December of 1969.42
There are a number of causes for the lack of interest in taking men
to the center. The unusual situation exists in which the police
department officially supports the center, but internal evaluation,
namely the non-quality arrest policy, tend to de-emphasize the use of
the center. It is the opinion of the past chairman of the police board
of commissioners that this results from lack of interest of the head
41. Leeming, More Use of Drunk Center Sought, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 15,
1970, § A, at 3, col. 6 ("Kendis . . . said that he had on occasion urged the police department
to bring patients to the center because of the high number of empty beds.").
42. Several months after our study was completed, in response to a controversy created by
several St. Louis Post-Dispatch articles, one of the personnel at the center cited the fact that
admissions had increased. He noted that the admission rate was very high (Ill patients) in
December. The implication that was intended from this argument is two-fold. First, there was
the suggestion that the difficulties which had developed were cured. Second, the indication was
that there were no difficulties, but that police are generally tighter in winter in that the low
admissions rate in summer was a result of this.
With respect to the first implication, the discontent and dissatisfaction that we found with the
center was too deep to be removed without an extensive effort. Many of the patrolmen had
reached the point where they thought the center was of no benefit to the men. This attitude, and
all of the other difficulties, are well ingrained in the minds of the arresting officers.
The second factor does not hold true in other cities. Also, a check of police statistics for years
prior to the detoxification center indicates that winter and summer arrests are fairly constant.
To the extent that there is a trend, the arrest rates are slightly higher in summer months. Arrest
data furnished by the department indicates that, in 1965, April, May and June had the three
highest monthly rates.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the increase in admissions, assuming that the statistics that
were cited are accurate, is artificial, and is created by pressures such as those that Dr. Kendis
exerted during the summer. If the higher rate is artificially imposed by pressures originating from
the detoxification center personnel, the greater cooperation is likely to be temporary.
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officials in the department . 3 He supports our observation that this
apparent ambivalence is perceived by the patrolmen.
Several of the officers whom we interviewed indicated that they had
taken men to the St. Mary's location, but would not take men out to
the state hospital. Transportation time out to the new location involves
a 30-minute ride in each direction. This additional processing time is
a persuasive argument against the officer taking the man to the center,
particularly in the context of a pickup which is not looked upon
favorably within the department.
Perhaps of equal weight is the fact that the new location seems out
of place to the officers as a place for derelict men. 44 The hospital itself
is a large sprawling complex, located in a middle class residential area,
and many of the officers feel uncomfortable there. Additionally, as
noted above, many officers reported that drunken men were refused
admission on several occasions. This anomaly of empty beds with a
refusal to take new patients apparently resulted from the disinterest of
several of the evening staff members.
V. MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING PROGRAM GOALS
A. General Comments.
As we have seen, the St. Louis detoxification program defines its
goals in terms of a very limited problem population, and under existing
enforcement practices, the treatment program never comes into contact
with a large percentage of the public intoxicant population and many
of the Skid Row intoxicants. Under prevailing police practices, the men
who are taken to the center are selected on what appears, with respect
to treatment objectives, to be an irrational or a random basis. Given
these limitations we turn to the issue of how well the program achieves
its goals with respect to the men it does receive.
The goal of providing a more humane shelter for the arrestees is
difficult to quantify in order to objectively measure the impact of the
new system. The determination of a scale of humane handling
43 This is intangible, of course, and impossible to measure objectively. The comment of former
Board President Dowd is relevant:
Every effort should be made to return the center to its old location .... The atmosphere
of a state mental hospital is not really conducive to the kind of thing our department. ..
envisioned.
Leeming. Dowd Censures Dump-Drunk Activity, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 18, 1970, § A,
at 14, col. 2.
44. Id
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procedures is clearly subjective. On this point, it is possible to note,
however, that some improvement over the city jail has occurred.
Much has been said to the literature concerning the need for
immediate medical treatment and for diagnosis of latent injuries and
illnesses of the public drunkenness arrestees. The medical services
provided by the detoxification center would be a marked improvement
over that available in most jurisdictions. However, in St. Louis, the
detoxification program must be measured against the pre-existing Code
26 procedure which provided the emergency medical care and diagnosis
that is lacking in other cities. Thus, the medical benefit, gained in the
detoxification program in St. Louis cannot involve this aspect.
The gain, if any, lies in the effects that holding the man at the center
for seven days and giving him continuing treatment and food has upon
his general physical well-being. A study of the detoxification center by
James Weber, which we discuss in greater detail below, recognized the
difficulties in constructing an objective index of this variable. 5 Weber's
study, based on observations of untrained interviewers, merely reports
that a general improvement was noted in many of the men interviewed.
B. Rehabilitation
Weber suggests that the success of the program in rehabilitation is
crucial to establishing the desirability of the detoxification effort. "Not
only must his kind of treatment program be shown to be economically
feasible, but . . . the individuals treated must accrue some positive
therapeutic effects." If these effects are not proven, Weber suggests
that the objection may be raised that the new system is nothing more
than a revised version of the "revolving door" of arrest-incarceration-
release-rearrest. 46
Weber recognizes that rehabilitation in this context has a multiple
meaning. His study attempts to deal with the evaluation of
rehabilitation by several indexes. These include residential factors,
employment, income, drinking characteristics, and the number of
police arrests. Weber's method was to interview 200 patients processed
through the detoxification center, and then to follow up with further
interviews no earlier than 90 days after the men had been released.
Based upon his study, Weber suggests that 50% of his sample of 200
patients experienced some overall improvement. 7
45. WEBER at B 10.
46. WEBER at B 1.
47. ALCOHOL, ALCOHOLISM AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 41 (D. Gillespie ed. 1969); WEBER at B
21-23.
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Unfortunately, the methodology of the study is such as to render the
results unreliable. First, Weber excluded from his sample those persons
who left the treatment program prior to the termination of the seven
day period and those persons who had not been residents of the St.
Louis area for at least three months prior to the day they were taken
to the center. These two exclusions accounted for 30% of the patient
intake at the center. Second, practical restrictions forced Weber to
limit his efforts to a 90 day follow up. This compares to the one-year
follow up period which Weber recognizes as an optimal balancing of
cost and scientific validity. Third, the data for the follow up study was
developed through open-ended interviews in which the derelict men
made their own assessment of their condition in the last three months.
While this interview technique is highly successful as a means of
gathering information concerning alcoholism patients if there is strong
rapport between the interviewer and his subject, the interview team used
in Weber's St. Louis study was composed of two St. Louis police
officers dressed in civilian clothes. It seems doubtful that the necessary
rapport existed. Fourth, in studying residence patterns of the subjects
Weber because of his short follow up period, was unable to adjust for
the fact that his efforts were disclosing only the length of time that a
patient remains at a facility to which he has been first referred. Fifth,
the study did not utilize a control group, and we are unable, therefore,
to judge what portion of the group would have remained abstinent or
improved their living style on their own, in the absence of the
detoxification process.
Since Weber's results are inconclusive, it is necessary to turn to other
indications of how effective the program has been in achieving its long-
term rehabilitation objectives. The center's reports contain an analysis
of after-care referrals with respect to employment and housing. This
referral process was designed as a primary method of improving the
life pattern of the men. However, the data indicates that only a small
percentage of patients accept referrals in these two areas.48 For
example, during the period of April 1, 1969 through June 30, 1968
there were 338 admissions; 142 (42%) of these were judged to need
assistance in the employment area, and 28% of these accepted the aid
that was offered. This represents approximately 12% of the total
number of patients admitted. With regard to housing, during the
summer months referred to above, aid was accepted in the form of a
housing referral by approximately 12% of the total patient load.
48. ST Louis DETOXIFICATION CENTER, SEVENTH QUARTER! Y REPORT, APPENDIX (1968).
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While we are not prepared to say that the detoxification center is
merely a relabeled version of the "revolving door," the apparent failure
to establish success in terms of rehabilitation variables is important.
The program spends approximately $42.00 per patient per day. A large
percentage of this is devoted to the referral and therapy efforts. Also,
the desire to rehabilitate has caused the system to be designed in terms
of a seven day stay per patient. This, of course, precludes the program
from handling a larger caseload. It seems reasonable to suggest that a
more substantial proof be required that the efforts towards
rehabilitation are successful to such a degree as to justify the
expenditure and the restrictions placed upon this system.49
C. Reduction in Public Costs.
The Weber study attempted an analysis of the cost of treatment in
the program compared to the cost of the old system of processing the
arrestees through the criminal process. This involved a "simple cost
accounting" methodology. As might be expected, cost reductions are
found in the prosecutor's office, courts and the jail system. There was
a 40% decrease in the number of informations issued against
drunkenness offenders in 1966 as compared to 1964. Also, there was a
38% decrease in the number of persons committed to the city
workhouse on the charge of "drunk-on-the-street" during the same
period. 0
An important consideration in evaluating these comparisons is that,
even prior to the detoxification system, the burden upon the criminal
justice agencies in St. Louis was not severe. The extremely low arrest
rate meant that few drunkenness cases were ever processed by the
prosecutor, courts or jails. As far as the St. Louis system is concerned
the primary burden on the criminal system is found in connection with
police time devoted to handling drunkenness offenders.
Weber's study reports that there occurred a 57% reduction in the
processing time that the officers were required to devote to an average
drunk-on-the-street pickup: However, the 57% reduction must be taken,
not as indicating the timesaving to the police which can be expected in
a traditional criminal system, but as measuring the benefits of
providing a central location for diagnosis and treatment at which the
49. See Morris & Hawkins, The Overreach of the Criminal Law, 9 MIDWAY 1, 9 (1969)
(wherein a program not involving substantial rehabilitation efforts is proposed as being
economically feasible).
50. ST. Louis DETOXIFICATION CENTER, FIFTH QUARTERLY REPORT (1968).
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officer can leave the patient. Prior to the creation of the detoxification
center, the Code 26 procedure required the police to take drunkenness
offenders to various city hospitals, and to wait for their arrestees to be
examined. Under the new system, the officers no longer were forced to
wait for the examination to be completed. It should also be noted that
the 57% reduction refers to the operations of the center while at the
St. Mary's facility. Its present location substantially increases the
processing time for most of the drunkenness pickups, because of the
longer riding time from the site of most pickups to the detoxification
center. Adjusting the statistics to reflect this increased riding time
indicates that the time reduction is about 33%.
Another aspect of relative costs concerns whether or not these
decreases reflect a savings to the entire public structure. While it is
clear that the agencies in the criminal justice system are saving some
money, these savings may be more than compensated for by the
increased expenditures necessary to construct and to implement the
detoxification system. Its budget of over $200,000 exceeds what might
reasonably be estimated to be the cost to the city of processing the
drunk as a criminal case, and compares to a "saving," not including
the project budget, of $64,000 projected in 1967. 5t
VI. OBSERVATIONS
The St. Louis detoxification program is a social experiment which,
at least, has not completely failed. Certainly, however, the growing
tendency to view the detoxification concept as a panecea for the ills of
the criminal system in processing the public intoxicant is not warranted
in light of the St. Louis experience. 52 The data concerning rehabilitation
51. Projected savings for 1967 were:
POLICE:
Manhours $12,500
Holdovers 2,500
Administrative 7,500
$22,500
CITY .4GENCIES:
Hospital $22,000
Court 3,500
Workhouse 16,000
$41,500
$64,000
V STRECHER, L-AW ENFORCEMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT SOURCE BOOK 31 (1968).
52 See H. Mattick & R. Chused, The Misdemeanant Offender 37 (unpublished, University of
Chicago Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, 1967).
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are inconclusive, and there is indication that the rate of success is not
high. This should not be surprising, however, since any person
knowledgeable in the problems of Skid Row men would not expect
resounding success in any treatment program, especially where the
treatment calls for no more than a seven-day in-house experience. The
inconclusive results, however, are important when contrasted with the
cost of the program.53
The difficulties experienced with the police are signficant. Even if
rehabilitation is not often achieved, the new approach is justified on the
basis of providing a centralized locale at which proper medical
attention is available. The medical care only reaches those persons who
are brought in by the police, and the extent to which the police fail to
bring in destitute intoxicants in need of these services limits the success
of the new program.
Much of the difficulties experienced with the police result from a
failure to "package the detoxification product" in such a way as to
make this alternative attractive to the individual patrolmen, thereby
increasing their use of the program. The concept of better packaging
involves many variables, and the necessary steps would vary in each
jurisdiction according to prevailing tradition and pressures. Several
specific comments concerning St. Louis illustrate the approach. First,
the tradition of the department relating to non-quality arrests and the
evaluative structure which maintains this tradition should be altered.
The emphasis within the department, not merely in official
communiques but also in attitudes of command personnel, should be
to encourage the patrolmen to use the new program. Second, steps
should be taken which minimize the processing time required for the
arresting officer who wishes to take his man to the detoxification
center. Third, informal handling of destitute intoxicants should be
discouraged. Fourth, officers should be instructed that the
detoxificaion alternative is beneficial to the men. Fifth, the capacity
of the center should be such as to ensure that when an intoxicant is
picked up, there will be room for him at the center. If the internal
53. The notion that a treatment cure is appropriate for these arrestees stems from the influence
of alcoholism theory upon the problem. A relatively new concept, the illness characterization of
alcoholism has been central to several appellate rulings relating to public drunkenness. See, e.g.,
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). A problem
is that it over-emphasizes drink-related difficulties to the exclusion of welfare, residential and
medical problems of the men. One expert suggests that alcoholism theory is irrelevant to Skid
Row drinking. Wallace, The Road to Skid Row, 16 Soc. PROB. 92, 93 (1968).
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modifications produce an increased arrest rate, the size of the center
should be increased to meet the growing need, or the length of each
patient's stay should be reduced.
The St. Louis experience gives good cause to consider whether the
intake operation should be handled through the police or by civilian
teams. Typical arguments for retaining the police relate to availability
(they are already organized and trained), experience (they have handled
this problem for many years), cost (it would be expensive to train a
civilian force to cover the entire city) and the potentiality of violence
(they are trained to handle the occasional recalcitrant or disorderly
man). On the other hand, the civilian procedure is advocated because
it most often is conceived of as a voluntary process (avoiding
controversial state power issues and giving a more co-operative
treatment population) and because the attitudes of specially trained
functionaries are likely to be more understanding of the men (police
officers may brutalize the drunk).
The difficulties in St. Louis suggest that an additional, practical
consideration is the extent to which the treatment facility is able to
control its intake process. The police labor under the influence of
traditional ways of handling the men, a general attitude that the police
task is to handle violent crime and skepticism concerning the validity
of treatment as an effective method of handling the drunk. These
attitudes are especially difficult to alter without the full and continuing
co-operation of the command structure in the department.
At the heart of this choice is, of course, a determination of what
problem population the new program is designed to reach. Too often
the complexity of this issue is ignored on the assumption that in some
ill-defined way, the drunkenness arrestee population represents a unique
grouping, both in terms of immediate needs and rehabilitative
potential. However, the composition of this unique group is determined
by police arrest criteria, and these criteria often are most responsive to
departmental tradition, intra-system pressures and external pressures,
than to the needs of the intoxicated men. The extent to which the
unique characteristics of this group have meaning for the treatment
program is determined by the relation of the selection criteria to the
treatment objectives.
An illustration demonstrates the disparity which might arise. Our
research in New York's Bowery reveal that various pressures restrict
police arrest practices to a minimum. The drunkenness pickups that are
made are designed primarily to develop statistics to demonstrate that
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the police are "doing something about" the Skid Row men. However,
the New York police never arrest the most debilitated public
intoxicants because they must process their defendant through a day
long procedure, and therefore desire a man who is ambulatory. If a
detoxification program were attached to this police enforcement
technique, the relevance of its emphasis on medical care would be
questionable in light of its failure to reach those Bowery men who are
most in need of immediate help. Significantly, efforts to remove
drunkenness from the criminal sphere in New York employ civilian,
not uniformed police, rescue squads to remove the derelicts from the
street.54If we look beyond the arrestee population in search for a target
grouping, at least two possibilities emerge. These are: the entire
destitute public intoxicant population and the Skid Row derelict
population. The choice involves a difficult policy determination. This
first category makes some sense in that there are common
characteristics which relate to the treatment and service objectives.
These men are presumably all intoxicated and, by being in a public
place, may present a situation in which intervention is indicated to
protect them.
The relevance of the second grouping is indicated by the traditional
focus of the criminal law enforcement of these laws. Public intoxicants
with homes or resources have commonly been handled by the police on
an informal basis, and the practicality and preferability of this
disposition seems seldom to be questioned. Rather, these laws are
frequently used to deal with the needs of the Skid Row men whose
physical condition places them in danger from the elements or other
men or whose resources are insufficient to obtain aid. It is instructive
that many of the men arrested on Skid Row are not drunk and that
the fact of the person's intoxication is seldom the primary cause for
arrest.5
In either of these two contexts the St. Louis program appears as only
a one-half program. It cannot possibly deal with either of these two
groups, both of which are larger than the arrestee population. The
police could not, even if they desired to, increase the pickup rate to
reach more men because of the bed limitations of the program. The
54. DRUNKENNESS REPORT 58.
55. PHILADELPHIA DIAGNOSTIC & RELOCATION SERVICE CORPORATION, ALTERNATIVES TO
ARREST 15 (1967).
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center cannot expand its contacts merely by increasing the number of
beds because traditional police policies and internal pressures interfere
with an increased pickup rate.
Also, there is a structural consideration which is seldom discussed.
By emphasizing rehabilitation of all of the patients, the St. Louis
program must devote intensive efforts upon each and this necessitates
high cost per patient and a longer patient in-house term. This latter
result prevents the new program from handling a large caseload with
the same number of beds as is done in Washington where the average
stay per patient is around two days and the per day cost is
approximately $16.00. The Washington model is better able to deal
with the protective concerns and it relegates the rehabilitation concern
to be applied only to those patients who wish to be transferred to a
longer term care facility. The loss, if any, in terms of number of
successful efforts at rehabilitation has not been measured.
The upshot of these observations is not that the detoxification model
should be abandoned, but that its use and structure should be subjected
to more incisive scrutiny. The difficult policy questions involved in
choosing intake source, treatment emphasis and problem population
identification cannot be answered on a generalized basis. The needs of
each jurisdiction may vary and the program should be modified to meet
these needs, after the policy questions have been discussed and resolved.
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